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The combination of economic games and human neuroimaging presents the possibility of using economic probes
to identify biomarkers for quantitative features of healthy and diseased cognition. These probes span a range of
important cognitive functions, but one new use is in the domain of reciprocating social exchange with other
humans - a capacity perturbed in a number of psychopathologies. We summarize the use of a reciprocating
exchange game to elicit neural and behavioral signatures for subjects diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder
(ASD). Furthermore, we outline early efforts to capture features of social exchange in computational models and
use these to identify quantitative behavioral differences between subjects with ASD and matched controls. Lastly,
we summarize a number of subsequent studies inspired by the modeling results, which suggest new neural and
behavioral signatures that could be used to characterize subtle deficits in information processing during
interactions with other humans.
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The challenges of social exchange are shared throughout
the animal kingdom [1-3]. Humans engage in repeated
reciprocal interactions with kin and non-kin; this has
required our species to develop a particular capacity to
track these interactions and assign credit and blame
accordingly [3-6]. The underlying neurobiological
mechanisms underlying these abilities in humans remain
an open area of investigation, which is generating insight
into a number of mental illnesses including autism
spectrum disorders (ASD) [7-18].
One important challenge for an agent engaged in
social exchange is the ability to generate models of
others’ mental states, a capacity referred to as ‘theory of
mind’ [19,20]. Human neuroimaging experiments have
implicated a consistent set of brain regions hypothesized
to be involved in this process [21-24]. The role of this
kind of computation and others are exemplified in even
the simplest exchanges. For instance, in a fair trade the* Correspondence: read@vt.edu
1Human Neuroimaging Laboratory and Computational Psychiatry Unit,
Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute, Roanoke, VA 24016, USA
4Department of Physics, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2012 Kishida et al.; licensee BioMed Central
Commons Attribution License (http://creativec
reproduction in any medium, provided the orbrains of the interacting agents must be able to: (1)
compute norms for what is considered fair; (2) detect
deviations from such norms; and (3) select appropriate
actions based on these deviations.
Reciprocating social exchanges and their related
computations occur in our daily lives and are the basis
for a number of staged interactions in clinical practice.
However, the computations themselves likely occur well
below our threshold for conscious experience. For
example, in the diagnostic procedures for ASD a trained
professional interacts with a suspected patient and
navigates a predetermined series of give-and-take scenar-
ios (for example, the Autism Diagnostic Observation
Scale (ADOS) [25]); during this interaction the clinician
tries to detect typical and atypical social gestures based
on trained-up (for example, experience-based) expecta-
tions of behavior. Additionally, insight into the patient’s
social cognitive process is sought using interviews of the
patient and family members [26,27].
Computational approaches in combination with
quantitative probes of behavior (for example, game
theoretic paradigms [28,29]) promise to reveal under-
lying dimensions of healthy human decision-making and
thereby will provide a basis for which to compare againstLtd. .This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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promise to excel, over traditional approaches, in captur-
ing quantitative normative behavior and associated
neurobiological responses. In these tasks participants are
required to make decisions under incentivized condi-
tions; the incentive is typically a monetary one and the
decision spaces are restricted by the particular game
[28]. The games may be against a ‘roll of the dice’ or
against real or simulated agents (for example, other
humans or computer simulations) and can be employed
though a computer interface. These conditions can
augment traditional diagnostic procedures by providing
additional behavioral and neurobiological measurements.
In computer-based game play, the behaviors elicited and
signals exchanged between players are all captured
within the patient-computer interface. These measure-
ments can then be directly ported into tests over
competing computational models about hypothesized
cognitive processes underlying social behavior. In
addition, variables within the games are designed to be
parametric, which provides increased specificity in the
analysis of associated brain responses. The use of the
internet and technologies like hyperscanning, which
synchronizes fMRI scanners and study participants over
the internet [32], has already and will continue to allow
more complex social exchange to be studied while
allowing experimenters to have control over which
signals are exchanged. These methods take highly
complex social interactions and reduce the exchanges to
simpler, more tractable, dimensions for quantitative
analysis; and, have recently been applied to the
neurobiological investigation of social exchange [33-38].
Fairness and cooperation games dominate these recent
efforts because they assess a subject’s internal norm for
what is fair in an exchange, and they require that each
subject model their partner’s mental state [28,39-45].
These games are excellent experimental probes because
they are simple, there is an existing body of behavioral
data employing them across a variety of contexts, and
there are known solution concepts for how they ‘should’
be played by a rational self-interested agent [28,40,41].
Importantly, these games all require participants to
model their partner. Such simplified behavioral probes
provide a starting point for extracting quantitative
descriptions of social signaling and its pathologies. These
games are beginning to prove valuable in early work in
clinical populations such as borderline personality
disorder [34] and ASD [45,46].
Games to study autism spectrum disorders
The economic games employed in human decision-
making experiments range from relatively simple gam-
bling games to more complex social signaling tasks [40].
The latter has recently been employed to study socialexchange and associated mentalizing operations in parti-
cipants diagnosed with ASD [45,46]. These studies used
two-person sequentially iterated games with multiple
rounds (Figure 1A). These games are mathematically
more complicated than one-shot exchange games found
in the economic literature, but they allow the observa-
tion of iterated exchange where signaling between
participants can provide valuable learning and guidance
cues that are analogous to the kinds of signals we use
during more natural social exchange. The two earliest
games to be used to probe social behavior in an ASD
cohort include the multi-round trust game (Figure 1B
[46]) and the stag-hunt game [45]. Both of these games
possess an optimal strategy where the players cooperate;
however, participants must infer their partner’s strategy
from the behavioral signals exchanged within the
context of the game and if they are wrong they may
incur costly penalties for misjudging the cooperativeness
of their partner. The reduction of the space from where
social signals originate in these games (compared to
more naturalistic settings) provides an ability to
explicitly differentiate what signals are being exchanged
from those that must be inferred. This reduction of the
behavioral space is a benefit for the application of
computational approaches to the behavioral data and
has begun to reveal interesting quantitative aspects
required for healthy social exchange. The multi-round
trust game (Figure 1B) and the stag-hunt game are
played between two agents with repeated interactions.
This allows participants to learn from signals sent and
the feedback received in subsequent stages of the game
(Figure 1A). These games have been described in detail
elsewhere including the respective theoretical develop-
ment of the notions of optimal play, however for the
purpose of discussion we will briefly describe the main
rules for each game below.
The multi-round trust game (Figure 1B, [34,46,47]):
(1) there are two players, an anonymous ‘investor’ and
an anonymous ‘trustee’; both players have full knowledge
of what the other player’s options are given the rules of
the game; (2) the investor is given 20 points to invest
with the trustee (should they decide to); (3) once an
investment is made (range of possibilities = 0 to 20
points in 1-point increments) the trustee receives three
times the investment and the investor keeps what they
did not invest; (4) now the trustee decides how much to
reciprocate to the investor (the range of possibilities = 0
to 3 times the investment, in 1-point increments); (5)
the trustee keeps what they did not reciprocate and the
amount reciprocated is added to the investor’s total; (6)
at the end of each round the totals for each player are
shown to both players and ‘deposited’ into each of their
respective banks; (7) this game is repeated for a total of
10 rounds where each round starts with a fresh 20
Figure 1 Two-party social exchange games to probe autism spectrum disorder neurobehavioral responses. (A) Two-party repeated
interaction games with feedback and learning. Two-party signaling games allow for the investigation of social exchange between two (or more)
agents. The signals sent between participants are controlled such that the information sent and the information that must be inferred is explicit
and controlled by the experimenter. Multi-round games allow for the development of reputation and the opportunity for learning and adapting,
which allow for the study of interesting social dynamics in a controlled and objectively quantitative manner. (B) Multi-round trust game. The
multi-round trust game is a 10-round repeated interaction between the same two partners. Player 1 (‘investor’) is endowed with 20 points and is
to decide how much, if any, to share with the ‘trustee’ (player 2); the amount shared is tripled on its way to the trustee; the trustee then decides
how much, if any, to repay to the investor; at the end of each round the total points earned/kept by each player is put into a ‘bank’; and the
subsequent round begins with a new endowment of 20 points.
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aside to be tallied up at the very end of the game; (8) at
the end of 10 rounds the totals in the bank for each
player determines how much real money they will be
paid and is how the game is incentivized: the more
points one earns the more real money they will take
home. To earn the most points possible the players must
cooperate; however, generous signals of cooperation can
be taken advantage of and a player may cheat the other
out of an equal distribution of the profits.
The stag-hunt game also engages two participants and
also requires participants to cooperate to achieve
maximal gains. The goal of the game is to ‘hunt’ either a
‘stag’ (big profits) or a ‘rabbit’ (smaller profits). The
players see a game board where they can move one
square at a time and do so sequentially. In this manner,
the participants observe the behavior of their partner
and attempt to infer whether the move was intended to
hunt the stag (cooperate) or a rabbit (defect). The
rabbits do not move and are positioned on the board
such that they can be hunted by the efforts of a single
player, but provide a small payoff; on the other hand,
two players must cooperate to hunt the stag and are
rewarded for doing so with a bigger point value. Each
move in the game that does not collect either a rabbit or
a stag is viewed as a cost and diminishes a player’s point
total. In the implementation of this game by Yoshida
and colleagues the stag moved first, then the humanparticipant, then a computer agent partner [45]. Like the
multi-round trust game the players point totals are
directly tied to the amount of real money they will take
home at the end of the experiment, thus incentivizing
participants to make truthful expressions of their prefer-
ences and assessments of the game state.
Yoshida and colleagues’ results from applying the stag-
hunt game to investigate hidden cognitive processes such
as belief inference in autistic populations is particularly
promising for our understanding of ASD and for compu-
tational and game theoretic approaches to investigating
the heterogeneity known to exist within the spectrum
[45]. The application of their ‘game theory of mind’ [43]
demonstrated an ability to differentiate ASD symptom
severity by a parameter in their model related to the
patient’s ability to infer the strategic sophistication of
their partner; the authors clarify this as the ability to
infer the partner’s mindreading strategy. Additionally this
parameter was distinct from the models estimate of
patients’ ability to plan iteratively, which was not related
to symptom severity, but rather showed a strong
correlation with intellectual ability as assessed by verbal
and non-verbal intelligence tests [45].
Early results from the multi-round trust game
The multi-round trust game has been used to investigate
social exchange in pairs of healthy individuals [34,46-48]
and pairs consisting of a healthy investor and a trustee
Kishida et al. Journal of Neurodevelopmental Disorders 2012, 4:14 Page 4 of 11
http://www.jneurodevdisorders.com/content/4/1/14diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder including: ASD
[46,48], borderline personality disorder [48,49], major
depression [48], and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder [48]. Tomlin and colleagues identified a specific
response pattern along the anterior to posterior axis of
the cingulate cortex [47]. They identified that a spatial
pattern of activity that corresponded with ‘self ’ and
‘other’ phases of the trust game exchange. This agent-
specific response did not modulate with the number of
points exchanged, the character of the gesture (benevo-
lent or malevolent [34,47]), or role (investor or trustee)
of the player; the response pattern was specific to who
was acting at that particular stage of the game (that is,
‘me’ or ‘not me’). Additionally, the agent-specific pattern
of activity was absent when the players participated in a
control experiment where the partner was absent and
the players knowingly engaged in a computer-driven task
[47]. This result suggested that the cingulate ‘self ’ and
‘other’ response patterns may be affected in special
populations where these signals would be important for
social exchange.
Chiu and colleagues tested this hypothesis by investi-
gating social pairs consisting of a healthy investor and aFigure 2 Spatial principal components analysis identifies ‘self-eigenm
(A) Cingulate hemodynamic responses from the trustees’ brain during the
defined domains along the posterior to anterior axis were subjected to prin
identified was the ‘self-eigenmode’, which captures the dynamic agent-spe
evolves. The self-eigenmode flips its sign as the game transitions from the
cingulate response during multi-round trust game. The self-eigenmode res
full set of the cingulate self-basis. Each of the red circles is a single TR in th
phases of the trust game in the trustee brain. These responses are plotted
shows how the cingulate response is dynamic, yet regular and throughout
Increased self-responses are indicated by more positive values on the self-e
indicated by more negative values on the self-eigenmode. On the left we
to an following the submission of a repayment by the trustee; and, on the
following the submission of an investment by the investor.trustee diagnosed with ASD [46]. This work shed light
on the role of the agent-specific cingulate response
patterns during social exchange and on altered neural
responses in patients diagnosed with ASD. The authors
used an analytical approach to disentangle various
modes of operation in the cingulate cortex using princi-
pal components analysis applied to spatio-temporal data
measured in the cingulate during the social exchange
game. One mode they identified matched the previously
observed agent-specific response profile and was named
the ‘self-eigenmode’ due to the specific phase of social
exchange in which it was elicited (Figure 2). Determining
the self-eigenmode allows the reduction of the spatial
pattern of activity to a single dimension and compares
the role this ‘response pattern’ plays in social exchange
iterations. Chiu and colleagues went on to show that this
pattern was also elicited during perspective taking shifts
in a structured imagery task [46] and demonstrated that
participants with ASD showed diminished responses
along the self-eigenmode specifically during the self-
phase of the trust game (Figure 3A [46]). These results
led to the demonstration that a region in the middle
cingulate cortex (the peak regions in the self-eigenmode)ode’ response during social exchange (adapted from [46]).
‘self’ and ‘other’ phases of the multi-round trust game. The spatially
cipal components analysis. Among the principal components
cific spatio-temporal activity in the cingulate as the trust game
self-phase to the other phase of the trust game. (B) Phase dynamics of
ponse does not evolve in isolation. Three eigenvectors characterize the
e measurement of the BOLD response during the self and other
in the three dimensions that comprise the cingulate self-basis and
repeated trials of the self and other phases of the trust game.
igenmode axis (vertical axes); whereas non-self or ‘other’ responses are
observe positive values on the self-eigenmode dimension leading up
right we observe negative self-eigenmode values in the trustee brain
Figure 3 ASD trustees show diminished cingulate self-response pattern during social exchange in the multi-round trust game
(adapted from [46]). (A) Diminished cingulate response pattern during ‘self–phase’ of the iterated multi-round trust game. The ‘other’ response
pattern was similar in ASD (n= 12) and age- and IQ-matched control participants (n= 18). However the cingulate ‘self’ response was diminished in
the ASD cohort. Projection of the BOLD response pattern onto the cingulate self-eigenmode reveals the contribution of that mode of operation
in the cingulate, and show that it is significantly diminished in the ASD cingulate cortex. (B) Regions in the middle cingulate cortex show
diminished response, which correlates with ASD symptom severity. The middle regions of the cingulate cortex show significant correlation with
symptom severity in the ASD cohort. The less active this region is during the self-phase is correlated with the communication subscale, social
subscale, and overall score on the Autism Diagnostic Interview, Revised (open circles: ADI-R communication subscale, r =−0.69, p=−0.012; light
blue filled circles: ADI-R social subscale, r =−0.70, p= 0.011; dark blue filled circles: ADI-R total score, r =−0.73, p= 0.007).
Figure 4 Middle cingulate cortex differentiates perspective taking responses during eyes-closed imagery. (A) Time-series of BOLD
response in middle cingulate cortex during structured imagery task. (Inset: mask used in time-series analysis.) Mean BOLD response (% signal
change from baseline) along the vertical axis; time (s) along the horizontal axis. Plotted: mean response of the middle cingulate cortex
(MCC) ± standard error about the mean for motor-imagery trials (solid lines) and visual-imagery trials (dashed lines) for expertise-congruent
conditions (blue lines) and expertise-incongruent trials (red lines). Note: the MCC responds during motor-imagery trials, but not during visual-
imagery trials (solid lines vs. dashed lines, time-points +4 s to +12 s, see dashed box), and the MCC does not differentiate expertise-congruent
trials from expertise-incongruent trials during eyes-closed visual or motor imagery (blue lines vs. red lines, time-points +4 s to +12 s). Asterisks:
p< 0.05, (one-tailed t-test, n= 81 subjects: ‘do it’> ‘watch it’ collapsed over congruency conditions). (B) Middle cingulate response during eyes-
closed imagery. Familiarity with subject and action (for example, athletic expertise congruency) does not separate MCC response during eyes-
closed imagery; however, first-person perspective-taking does.
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Figure 5 Self and Other Faces task shows visual response in
middle cingulate cortex. (A) Self-Other Faces task paradigm.
Twenty-five healthy adult participants were shown pictures of
themselves (15 unique pictures, eyes forward and smiling) and
pictures of another gender-matched volunteer (15 unique pictures,
eyes forward and smiling). The pictures were shown for 4 s and in a
randomized order. The inter-trial interval was jittered using 2 s, 4 s,
or 6 s. (B) Time-series of BOLD response in middle cingulate cortex
during Self-Other Faces task. (Inset: ROI mask derived from
structured imagery task (see Figure 4)). Mean BOLD response (%
signal change from baseline) along the vertical axis; time (s) along
the horizontal axis. Pictures are displayed at time= 0 s for a duration
of 4 s. Error bars: Standard error around the mean; asterisks: p< 0.05,
(one-tailed t-test, n= 25 subjects: ‘self’-picture response> ‘other’-
picture response).
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correlated with their symptom scores on the Autism
Diagnostic Interview, Revised [26] social exchange and
communication sub-scales, but not the repetitive beha-
viors scores; the diminished cingulate self-response also
correlated with their overall ADI-R score (Figure 3B
[46]).
We hypothesize that perspective-taking responses may
be elicited automatically during the first moments of
engaging another agent preceding active social exchange.
To investigate brain responses consistent with this
hypothesis we looked for responses in the athletes’
brains (during the structured mental imagery task [46])
that were active during eyes-closed perspective-taking
and during visual observation of athletically active
agents. Additional file 1: Figure S1 shows the paradigm
executed by the accomplished athletes (adapted from
[46]). Also, in Additional file 2: Figure S2, we show that
the self-response is greatly diminished when individuals
perform eyes-closed visual imagery (a kind of third-person perspective-taking), which is comparable to the
response observed in the ASD participants when they
ought to be showing a characteristic cingulate self-
response (Figure 3A). A conjunction analysis (n = 81,
p< 0.001, FDR corrected) looking for regions active in
response to eyes-closed first-person perspective-taking
and self-congruent visual stimuli identifies the middle cin-
gulate cortex (inset Figure 4A), bilateral caudate, and the
thalamus (not shown). Among these regions, the middle
cingulate cortex (inset Figure 4A) is unique in the time
series of the BOLD response (Figure 4A). Consistent with
the GLM contrast, the middle cingulate cortex differenti-
ates first-person from third-person perspective-taking,
and self-congruent from self-incongruent visual stimuli
(video); however, unlike the other regions identified in this
contrast, we show that the middle cingulate cortex does
not demonstrate a change in response to self-(in)congru-
ency (that is, familiarity) during the eyes-closed mental
imagery phase of the task (Figure 4A dotted box and
expanded in Figure 4B). This result suggests that the
diminished middle cingulate responses observed in the
ASD participants may be due to diminished first-person
perspective-taking ability, which is consistent with criteria
described in the DSM-IV-TR. The fact that the video clips
elicit responses in the middle cingulate cortex that do
differentiate degrees of familiarity suggest it may be
feasible to test responses in this region using simpler
‘self ’ and ‘other’ stimuli. We tested this hypothesis
using a simple self and other picture task (Figure 5).
Twenty-five healthy adult participants viewed pictures
of themselves and another person while undergoing
an fMRI brain scan (Figure 5A shows faces task para-
digm). We performed a region of interest inspection
of the time-series of the BOLD response in the mid-
dle cingulate cortex using a mask (Figure 4A inset)
derived in the structured imagery task (Additional file
1: Figure S1). Figure 5B demonstrates visual responses
in the middle cingulate cortex that differentiate pic-
tures of ‘self ’ from pictures of an ‘other’. This kind of
simple task may be used to identify deficient self-
responses in individuals diagnosed with ASD. Note:
these analyses were carried out on data collected with
the approval of the Institutional Review Board at
Baylor College of Medicine under guidelines in com-
pliance with the Helsinki Declaration.
Extracting useful models during staged social exchanges
The multi-round trust game is a relatively rich task
between two interacting subjects that requires several
cognitive capacities to be intact for normal patterns of
exchange. Ultimately, models of such exchanges will
have to take account of the load they impose on memory
systems, valuation systems, the capacity to recall and
adjust norms for fairness, the capacity to model one’s
Figure 6 Classification of Trustee ‘type’ from Investors’ behavior in two-party exchange. (A, B) Depiction of model-free clustering
approach using multi-round trust game data. The data used in this approach was collected in previous studies [34,46-49] A. The multi round trust
game is played between a healthy investor (black player) and a ‘target’ trustee (red player). The ‘target’ trustee was one of the following ‘types’:
major depressive disorder (MDD), personal [47], borderline personality disorder - non-medicated (BPD-N) [49], borderline personality disorder -
medicated (BPD-M) [49], impersonal [34], autism spectrum disorder (ASD) [46], and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) [47]. The
approach described in detail in Koshelev et al. (2010) examines the investor behavior as a polynomial of past rounds of investments and returns
(see panel B). i1, i2, . . . , it are the investments made by the investor during round t. Likewise, r1, r2, . . . , rt are the repayments made by the
trustee during round t. Classification of the investor-trustee dyad: is performed by predicting the investors’ decision at round t using a polynomial
where the order of the polynomial, the number of past rounds, and the number of clusters discovered are left as free parameters to be
discovered. The diagnostic categories for the trustee ‘type’ listed in panel A are blinded in this classification procedure. Only the behavior
(investments and repayments over rounds) in the multi-round trust game is used. The result of this classification determined that a first-order
polynomial, two rounds back, and four clusters were optimal. (B) Resulting four clusters and classification of diagnostic categories for model-free
biosensor approach. The resulting classification identified four clusters where individuals from each diagnostic category were over- (blue bars) or
under-represented (black bars). Vertical axes: investor-trustee dyad types (from top to bottom): MDD, personal [47], BPD-N [49], BPD-M [49],
impersonal [34], ASD [46], and ADHD [47]. Only the statistically significant categories (that is, greater than 1.5 standard deviations from the mean)
are labeled in each plot. Horizontal axes: standard deviations from the mean. Figure adapted from [48].
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to capture an important aspect of this reciprocating
exchange in a principled computational model [50]. The
idea is based directly on the natural signal class in this
game: deviations from fair exchanges, or to be more par-
ticular, deviations from neutral reciprocity. In this task,
neutral reciprocity is equivalent to ‘tit-for-tat’ behavior
where one subject matches (on average) the fractional
changes in money sent across rounds by their partner.
Deviation from such an exchange is known to be the
main ‘signal’ that causes one’s partner to change their
behavior [34]. The prevailing utility model for this game
is the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt[51], which also provides a natural way to ‘type’ players.
Player i’s valuation of their immediate payoff is defined
as:
Ui xi; xj; αi; βi
  ¼ xi  αimax xj  xi; 0
 
 βimax xi  xj; 0
  ð1Þ
Where xi is the amount of money acquired by player i
and similarly for player j. The αi and βi parameters
model envy (player j gets more than player i) and guilt
(player i gets more than player j). In Ray et al. [50], these
parameters were taken as the ‘type’ of each player in the
exchange and hence stratifies types of players according
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used the observed patterns of monetary exchange to
infer the type of each player and also included an
estimation of the most likely depth-of-thought used by
each player in the exchange - that is, how deep into the
interaction each player simulated in order to decide on
their next move. This is a potentially important estimate
in the context of ASD since this kind of parameter may
provide a new way to characterize one part of afflicted
individual’s differences in socio-emotional reciprocity.
The model provided a full generative model that was
able to capture broad classes of behavior observed in
subjects carrying out the trust game, but it has yet to be
applied directly to subjects with ASD playing the game
although these data exist [46].
A second model-based approach to social exchange in
subjects with ASD has been proposed by Koshelev and
colleagues (Figure 6 [48]). The approach used by Koshe-
lev et al. is computationally involved, but the idea
behind it is rather straightforward. Objectively measured
behavioral signals (iterated investments and repayments)
can be used to classify pair ‘types’, for instance healthy
pairs vs. pairs consisting of a healthy investor and a
patient (from a number of different psychopathologies
(Figure 6A)). The approach takes advantage of the possi-
bility of subtleties in game play that will allow the
differentiation of patient populations (for example,
participants diagnosed with ASD play differently than
participants diagnosed with BPD). Interestingly, the
differences in pair types are read out by looking at differ-
ences in how the healthy investor responds to the vari-
ous patient populations in the trustee role; this
highlights a biosensor approach as described in their
report [48]. Briefly, Koshelev and colleagues used a
Bayesian classification algorithm to agnostically classify
the observed relationship between investments and
repayments in preceding rounds and the next invest-
ment (Figure 6A). The investor’s decision at round ‘t’ (it)
is predicted using a polynomial, which incorporates
previous investment (it-n) and repayment (rt-n) decisions
by both partners (Figure 6A).
it ¼ β0þβ1it1þβ2rt1þβ3it2þβ4rt2 ð2Þ
The number of rounds back (‘t-n’), the order of the
polynomial, and the number of clusters to be identified
were all left as free parameters to be discovered in their
approach. Here, a Bayesian classification algorithm is
applied to the regression coefficients (β). One important
feature of this approach is that it focuses on how the
history of the game impacts the decisions of the healthy
investors. In all cases where psychopathology groups
were used as subjects, these players were always in the
trustee role (Figure 6A). Hence, studying the impact ofsuch groups on investor behavior uses the investor brain
as a kind of biosensor for features of the traditional
psychopathology group behavior as expressed through
this reduced two-person exchange. Figure 6B shows the
outcome of using this method on a very large population
of dyads where a healthy investor played a trustee drawn
from a number of psychopathology groups. The
approach is different from traditional cluster analysis
in that a probability distribution is estimated for all clus-
ters so that ASD subjects have a probability measure of
being in each cluster. ASD subjects were over-represented
in cluster 2 as shown in Figure 6B.
Work on these and similar models is underway and
will require large amounts of normative data to be able
to develop individual differences metrics useful in the
real-world of clinical applications. So while these results
are very preliminary, they are promising.
Discussion and future directions
Social impairments are among the defining characteris-
tics of ASD (from DSM IV-TR) [52]. Several influential
theories have been posited to explain these social
impairments seen in autism. The most prominent
hypotheses implicate anomalies in theory-of-mind, joint
attention, and functional cortical organization that
contribute to social deficits in ASD. Together, studies
across these domains highlight that individuals with
autism perform quite well in some tasks that require
inferring the beliefs and intentions of others, yet show
marked deficits in other social inferences. The current
state of the art in ASD research suggests there is signifi-
cant value for probing ASD subjects using staged social
exchange games paired with modeling approaches for
estimating objective parameters associated with deficits
in social computations.
To the authors’ knowledge, Yoshida and colleagues are
the first to report a computational model of theory-of-
mind processing applied to an ASD cohort [45]. In this
work they take advantage of the staged interaction of the
stag-hunt game. Like the trust game the stag-hunt game
incentivizes cooperation, but players must infer from the
behavior emitted from their partner whether cooperation
is being reciprocated and whether it remains the most
efficacious strategy. If the players infer a defection from
cooperation then the behavioral strategy must be flexibly
adapted. To develop their ‘game theory of mind’ [43] the
authors represent the goals of each player with value
functions derived from the machine learning literature.
Given two players in the stag-hunt game the authors
develop an estimation for their joint value function and
recursively iterate: my representation of your value func-
tions, your representation of my value functions, my
representation of your representation of my value func-
tions, and so on. The authors assume that this recursion
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ad infinitum and they estimate the depth of thought
(that is, sophistication) from the expressed behavior of
the players. Importantly, this mathematically expressed
theory-of-mind is only one form of the kind of computa-
tional expression that may capture the kinds of infer-
ences that occur during processes such as mentalizing
or that may reveal aberrant computations carried out in
the behavior and neural processes in individuals with
autism. Other models have been developed [50,53,54],
but have not been applied to the ASD population, which
may capture or highlight other interesting computations
necessary for adaptive mentalization. These kinds of
approaches are likely to yield interesting quantitative
characterizations of behavioral strategies and associated
brain responses. Indeed, Yoshida and colleagues have
reported interesting neural responses associated with
parameters in their model in healthy volunteers [44] and
have separately reported significant and interesting be-
havioral findings in a cohort of participants diagnosed
with ASD [45]. In the latter account, the group revealed
quantitative evidence for deficits in theory-of-mind pro-
cesses, but also revealed heterogeneity in their ASD co-
hort. This kind of heterogeneity is to be expected in the
broader ASD population and this finding is an important
demonstration of the quantitative power that these
games and applied computational approaches may have
going forward.
These early applications of game theory to probe the
behavioral space of social exchange have already revealed
interesting aspects that may be critical for healthy social
interaction. The advantages of these approaches will also
be derived from subsequent investigations into the
neural responses engaged during these games where
scientists may further reduce the stimulus space to test
the role of specific brain responses observed to be im-
portant. For example, Chiu and colleagues utilized the
multi-round trust game to reveal reduced activity in the
MCC during live social exchange that correlated with
increased symptom severity on two social subscales and
the overall score of the revised Autism Diagnostic Inter-
view, Revised [26,46]. Lack of a neural signal for the
first-person point-of-view in the cingulate cortex is sug-
gested by the follow-up work presented here investigat-
ing neural responses to perspective taking in a
experiment that controlled for effects of expertise famil-
iarity (Figure 4). The results and current interpretation
are consistent with a major subset of the clinical features
of ASDs including deficits in imaginative play, commu-
nication, and social exchange. In addition, other litera-
ture suggests that the cingulate cortex may be a key
anatomical region that differentiates humans and great
apes from other primate species [55,56] and is a major
site of cognitive integration serving many robustfunctions [57,58]. The MCC has specifically been impli-
cated in the attribution of ownership of limbs and
actions [47,59,60], willful production of speech and ac-
tion [61,62], and more recently agent discrimination and
perspective-taking during social exchange [46,47]. Our
results suggest that the visual response in MCC demon-
strated here may be related to an automatically gener-
ated representation akin to that elicited during first-
person perspective-taking. The various roles suggested
for the cingulate cortex imply that the function of this
region is complex and may serve highly integrated and
complex representations required for normal human
cognition. Its role in mentalizing or theory-of-mind
computations has yet to be investigated using a compu-
tationally rigorous model, suggesting an opportunity for
future work in this domain.
Game theoretic approaches for measuring deviations
from healthy decision-making behavior and the asso-
ciated neural responses are a novel, but rapidly develop-
ing area in quantitative neurobiological approaches to
understand mental disorders [30]. Neuroeconomic stud-
ies of healthy humans engaged in social decision-making
tasks has revealed a number of interesting insights into
brain responses associated with healthy human behavior
and are beginning to make inroads to understanding
ASDs. Early investigations into the possible genetic
underpinnings have revealed that parameters associated
with economic probes may show some significant herit-
ability [63,64]. An advantage that the economic probes
carry over traditional DSM criteria is in the objective
and quantitative nature of their assessments of behavior.
As these probes and computational descriptions of es-
timable model-based parameters develop so will the po-
tential to quantify and decompose specific dimensions of
social exchange. This is ultimately a task of reducing be-
havior and neural responses associated with mental ill-
ness to sub-components with the hope of providing
refined targets for diagnostic specificity and novel (or
improved) treatment strategies.
Conclusions
The work presented here represents the earliest develop-
ments of the use of computational and game theoretic
approaches to understand ASD. We present computa-
tionally obtained results from hyperscanned interactions
between healthy participants and participants diagnosed
with ASD. These interactions were social, however they
were reduced to quantitative exchanges governed by the
rules of the multi-round trust game. From these results
a region of interest in the middle cingulate cortex was
determined that was shown to differentiate self and
other perspective-taking in an eyes-closed mental im-
agery task. Additionally we demonstrate that passively
viewing pictures of oneself or another person elicits
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acity to develop passive picture viewing assays for mid-
dle cingulate function using fMRI. Clustering algorithms
applied to the behavioral gestures elicited during the
multi-round trust game and Bayesian modeling
approaches to social interaction were discussed to high-
light the impact quantitative approaches to ASD are be-
ginning to have. This work is clearly in its earliest stages,
but is showing promise towards having objective and
mathematically explicit theories of social cognition that
hope to elucidate associated neurobiological mechanisms
at multiple levels of investigation.
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